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NEED FOR AMERICAN PARLEY HIGHLIGHTED BY ARGENTINE MANEUVER

IN an unexpected counterattack on the Western Hemisphere's diplomatic ostracism of Argentina, the Farrell government on October 27 requested that the American Foreign Ministers be convened to consider its claim that Argentina's obligations under the terms of the Rio de Janeiro agreement had been fulfilled. The memorandum, on the surface an impressively reasoned statement, calls the American nations to review jointly with Argentina a fundamental aspect of its international policy, stating that "in the American community, no authentic, stable order can be created on the basis of the arbitrary exclusion of . . . one of its members."

OFFENSE THE BEST DEFENSE. The Argentine proposal was shrewdly timed to crystallize growing sentiment on the part of Latin American countries in favor of an inter-American conference to consider post-war affairs. Repeated hints—culminating in the outspoken comment of Mexican Foreign Minister Padilla—had come from various quarters. These could be considered mere diplomatic soundings of the State Department's views on the advisability of holding an inter-American parley in advance of a United Nations conference on world organization. But while the Buenos Aires request is basically a bid for Argentine participation in post-war planning, it seems to confuse the issue. For although Latin American chancelleries are anxious to make known their views on the position of small nations in the United Nations organization, proposed by the Dumbarton Oaks document, they are loath to consider in such public fashion the delicate question of continental policy toward Argentina.

In its position as one-time leader of the South American continent, and as a diplomatic outcast with everything to gain from a conference, Argentina has made further postponement of consultation on either or both of these vital questions very awkward. Today, extreme nationalists in Buenos Aires are con-

gratulating themselves on having maneuvered the United States into a position where, by accepting the Argentine proposal, it would tacitly recognize the Farrell régime, and by refusing it, would fail to use the Pan-American machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes so laboriously erected—and might even give the impression in some quarters that its charges against Argentina cannot be substantiated.

Argentina's request came through the Pan American Union—the only diplomatic channel still open to that country, since the Montevideo Committee for Political Defense of the Hemisphere formally dropped Argentina from membership last September. It is ironic that the Farrell government availed itself of the consultative procedure first established at the Buenos Aires Peace Conference of 1936, and never wholly accepted by Argentina.

PULL OF INTERESTS. The decision, in the final analysis, rests with all the American states. In deliberating their reply, they will undoubtedly be affected by their proximity to Argentina, as well as by the extent to which they are included in the political and economic orbit of the United States. Uruguay has already stated that it would take no decision for the time being, while Colombia and Venezuela promptly issued a joint statement to the effect that they would welcome such a conference.

Whether or not the Argentine request is acceded to, it seems likely that an inter-American conference on post-war plans will be held shortly. Many considerations have combined to relegate United States concern with Latin American affairs to the background—not the least of these being the paramount need for first obtaining agreement among the great powers on the fundamental principles of world organization. There are indications, too, that the United States has purposely refrained from collectively consulting other American nations on the question of post-war organization, in order to avoid the

appearance of cultivating an American bloc. Moreover, responsible leaders in the Western Hemisphere believe that the most urgent Latin American problems are related to political and economic adjustments on this continent attendant on the termination of the war, rather than participation in settling the technical aspects of security arrangements.

"TWO-EDGED SWORD." Whether the conference is held at the instance of Argentina or that of the United States—without the presence of an Argentine delegation—the point at issue remains the

same. The question is not merely fulfillment of the Rio pledges, nor is it simply a contest for continental leadership between the United States and Argentina. It is whether the presence in the New World of a European-inspired totalitarian state is to be tolerated. As a Montevideo paper recently pointed out, the diplomatic victory Buenos Aires would score in convening the Foreign Ministers might turn out to be a "two-edged sword" for the Farrell government, whose situation with respect to the rest of the continent may be greatly aggravated.

OLIVE HOLMES

FRENCH MODERATES MAY HEAL DE GAULLE-COMMUNIST RIFT

Two and a half months after the liberation of Paris, France still finds itself at a half-way stage between the war and the post-war period; deeply preoccupied with the problems of transition from a revolutionary state of resistance to Germany to one of law and order. So urgent are the day-to-day tasks, however, that the French have been unable to postpone national reconstruction, and already face the central issue of whether the men and women of diverse political faiths who banded together to help free the country from the Nazis can now maintain their unity for the purpose of creating a new France.

RECOGNITION STRENGTHENS UNITY. Official recognition of de Gaulle's régime as the Provisional Government of France by the United States, Britain, Russia and Canada on October 23 has served to strengthen France's internal unity. By this action, tardy as it seemed to many Frenchmen, the Allies removed the possibility that any opponents of the present French government might seek support abroad.

But it is chiefly because recognition restored France to a place in the councils of the United Nations that it increased de Gaulle's strength. For French spokesmen have shown signs of increasing restiveness—particularly since the Battle for Germany opened this autumn—at France's continued exclusion from inter-Allied discussions of the German question, in

which they feel France has a far more direct concern than any one of the Big Three. If this situation had persisted, the French might conceivably have looked for another leader than de Gaulle to obtain for their country the international role to which they feel it is entitled by its traditions and wartime sacrifices. Now that recognition has opened the way to France's entrance into the European Advisory Commission, which is mapping the armistice with Germany—as well as the United Nations organization proposed at Dumbarton Oaks—de Gaulle's leadership in the realm of foreign affairs has won the enthusiastic acclaim of the French.

PURGE SHARPENS DIFFERENCES. But important as Allied aid in cementing national unity may prove, the principal obstacles to France's post-war harmony must be overcome by the French themselves. One of these obstacles has arisen in connection with the purge trials now underway in courts throughout France. That collaborationists must be weeded out of public life is not open to doubt among the French who fought for liberation, but in carrying out this general principle they have not always found it easy to decide what constitutes treason. The moderates favor light sentences except when the accused delivered his compatriots to the Germans, while the more radical elements—particularly the Communists—insist on an extensive purge that would cover all Frenchmen identified with Fascist beliefs. The fact that the Ministry of Justice is exercising the right of pardon fairly extensively, except in cases where French men and women were denounced to the Germans, indicates that the government is accepting the moderates' view. Whatever course the French may decide to follow, France's allies must bear in mind that this matter is a strictly French affair and that popular clamor in behalf of a purge is more likely to die down quickly if action is taken promptly against some of the outstanding collaborators.

WHAT DEGREE OF STATE CONTROL? Even more serious than the purge as a test of French unity is the question of the system France should adopt.

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in its efforts to combine the traditional French belief in individual liberty with the nation's pressing need for a new economic order. The French choice is not between unrestricted free enterprise, on the one hand, and state-controlled economy, on the other. According to the best reports available, it appears that the demand for nationalization comes not only from the workers but also from large sections of the middle class, and reflects the prevailing belief that private control of industry was responsible for the ineffectiveness of French pre-war industry and, thus, for the military disaster of 1940. The war itself has also impeded the return to pre-war capitalism, since many leading French industrialists collaborated with the Germans—willingly or unwillingly—and the Nazis took over thousands of plants after paying their owners in francs secured through levies imposed on the French people.

At the same time, the degree of state control the French will accept is by no means settled, and a lively debate is now raging on the subject. The fact that no definite answer can be given to this question until national elections are held, following the return to France of the more than two and a half million prisoners-of-war and workers in Germany, makes it impossible for the Consultative Assembly—which opened its first sessions in Paris on November 7—to do more than debate the issue. Meanwhile, the government is obliged by the continuing requirements of the war, and the urgent problems of unemployment and national reconstruction, to embark at once on economic policies that will be at least temporarily accepted by the French people, and assure a livelihood to thousands who now have no choice except service in the armed forces.

De Gaulle defined a possible course in a key speech delivered at Lille on October 1. Declaring that the state should conduct the entire economic effort of the nation for the benefit of all, but without necessarily excluding private initiative and legitimate profit, he proposed a "directed" economy that would apparently nationalize the mines, electrical combines, banks and insurance companies. What the precise role of private capital would be under this scheme remains to be seen.

It is the Communists, however—rather than conservative circles interested in the future of private investments—who have strongly criticized de Gaulle's interim economic program. As an expression of their opposition to this and other official policies, they refused on November 2 to accept the government's de-

cision to disarm and dissolve the Communist-controlled militia, the "Patriotic Guard," and insisted on retaining this organization as a means of bolstering their bargaining power for a more leftist program. In the showdown between the left wing of the resistance movement and other elements in the government, de Gaulle has a distinct advantage that seems to insure his ultimate success. This is the existence among the French, despite revolutionary conditions that have accompanied liberation, of a kind of political balance-wheel that makes it difficult for the nation to move either to the extreme left or extreme right. The effectiveness of moderate elements in achieving an economic compromise that the majority of the French can enthusiastically endorse will be of the greatest importance not only to France but to Europe as a whole, for France's settlement of its economic problems is bound to influence other liberated nations on the continent.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

The French Right and Nazi Germany, by Charles A. Micaud. Durham, Duke University Press, 1943. \$3.50

A careful analysis of the steps whereby the French Right, because of its fear of Russia and communism, abandoned its traditional nationalist foreign policy and appeased Germany.

Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918-1939, by W. M. Jordan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$4.50.

A scholarly analysis of the fatal disagreements between France and Britain in making and maintaining the Treaty of Versailles. The contrasts between the two nations' policies on rearmament, reparation and boundary settlements are clearly presented.

American Diplomacy in Action, by Richard W. Van Alstyne. Stanford University, California, Stanford University Press, 1944. \$5.00

Dispensing with the usual chronological treatment of American diplomatic history, the author analyzes the recurrent problems in the foreign policy of the United States. The three divisions of the book suggest the range in content: Security and the Monroe Doctrine; Expansion; and Neutrality and Isolation. This use of the "case method" (derived from the teaching of law) will prove important beyond the field of diplomatic history.


The American Senate and World Peace, by Kenneth Colegrove. New York, Vanguard Press, 1944. \$2.00

A vigorous attack on the requirement of a two-thirds Senate majority for ratifying treaties as an obstacle in establishing a post-war peace system. The author argues that a constitutional amendment is needed to assure democratic control of United States foreign policy.

Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins, by Count Carlo Sforza. New York, Dutton, 1944. \$3.50

A valuable collection of the author's views and reminiscences on world affairs, containing a good deal not to be found elsewhere. The book, however, seems too long and tends to lose itself in detail.

Washington News Letter



RUSSIA'S CLAIMS TO IRAN OIL CREATE CONFLICT WITH U.S.

Late in the summer of 1943 representatives of two United States oil companies, Standard-Vacuum and Sinclair, and of the British Royal Dutch Shell arrived in Teheran as rival negotiators for a petroleum concession in southeastern Iran near the Afghan and Beluchistan border. On September 23, 1944, with Americans and British still negotiating, a Soviet economic mission headed by Vice Foreign Commissar Sergei Kavtaradze came to Teheran and requested an oil and mineral concession in Iran's five northern provinces. On October 16 the Iranian government announced that decisions on all concessions would be postponed until the war's end. This action has precipitated a controversy between the U.S.S.R. and the United States over policy toward Iran.

SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST PREMIER.

The United States has had a direct and solemn interest in the territorial integrity of Iran since December 1, 1943, when President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, at the Teheran Conference, signed a statement guaranteeing Iranian sovereignty as long as the war required the presence in Iran of U.S., British and Soviet troops. After the Iranian government's decision against the grant of concessions, the Soviet press and Vice Commissar Kavtaradze acted in a manner which, in the opinion of Prime Minister Mohammed Saïd Maragheï, was aimed at forcing the fall of his government. The Soviet trade-union newspaper, *Trud*, on October 22 accused Saïd of failing to curb Fascist elements in his country. Soviet troops besieged the Iranian garrison at Tabriz, and Kavtaradze declined to interfere. Do these Soviet actions violate Iranian sovereignty?

Saïd told U.S. Ambassador Leland Morris in Teheran on November 3 that he thought he might not resign despite his earlier belief that he would have to give up the Premiership for the sake of good relations between Iran and its neighbor Russia. Saïd, formerly Ambassador to Moscow, put a halt to the oil negotiations at the demand of his cabinet, a strong minority of which, dominated by nationalist sentiment and fear of the future, had opposed conversations with American and British oilmen. When the Iranians asked Kavtaradze his terms, he replied that he wished first to sign a general concession agreement and then discuss terms. The Teheran government held that this procedure should be reversed:

tudes on Iran came quickly into the open. On November 1 Ambassador Morris addressed a letter to the Iranian government stating that the United States raised no objection to the postponement of negotiations, and that the government's decision was entirely within the rights of an independent nation. This country's only concern, he said, is that it should not be discriminated against. The British adopted a position similar to that of the United States. On November 4 *Izvestia*, Soviet official newspaper in Moscow, complained that since "Britain has extensive oil concessions in southern Iran, why is the Soviet Union refused oil concessions in northern Iran?" The Czarist government had concessions in the provinces in which Moscow is now interested, but the Soviet government had surrendered them in 1919, at a time when its leaders opposed "imperialism."

U.S. ACTIVE IN IRAN. Whether the United States would interfere with an independent Soviet policy toward Iran after the war is unknown. In Asia, as in Europe, the Soviet Union wants friendly neighbors. Today Iran is wary of Russia, but friendly to the United States. The Iranian government has enlisted the assistance of about 75 U.S. citizens as expert advisers on finances and economics, petroleum matters, creation of an élite corps of rural police, reorganization of the army's supply services, improvement in public health, and modernization of education. The United States maintains in Iran a number of service troops who operate the railway from Bandar Shahpur on the Persian Gulf to Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea. Over this line move great quantities of lend-lease goods needed by the Soviet Union, and also about 10,000 tons a month of Iranian supplies.

The presence of these service troops has been of direct benefit to Russia. *Izvestia* claims that the troops are there without agreement with Iran, while Russian and British troops patrol the country under a treaty with Iran signed on January 29, 1942. A treaty drafted by the State and War Departments to regularize the presence of our troops in Iran, and guarantee their withdrawal after the war, has been in negotiation for two years. One of the obstacles to its conclusion is that the Iranians seek concessions which this government has not been disposed to grant, namely post-war ownership of U.S. Army installations, such as barracks.

BLAIR BOLLES

The conflict between the American and Soviet atti-

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